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ABSTRACT 
Syndicated loans are very important tools for financing investments of firms 
in a country and consequently for the development of the country as a whole. The 
emerging markets like ASEAN poses significantly high information asymmetry 
problem compared to Europe and United States, so that research on syndicated 
loans in this region is very necessary and important. This necessity also arises from 
the very promising growth and economic potential of the ASEAN region. 
The research uses Logit regression model to determine whether the loan size, 
loan maturity, public status of companies, secured loans, and country riskscould 
affect the decision of the lead arranger to syndicate the loan in the ASEAN region 
over the period 2006-2010. Robustness check that uses the Probit regression model 
were performed to check the efficiency of the results. 
It was found that the lead arranger tends to syndicate the loans when the 
maturity of the loan is shorter, the loan is secured, and the country risk is higher. 
The size of the loan and the public company status has insignificant effects to the 
decision of the lead arranger to syndicate the loan.  
Those findings show that the lead arranger considers to diversify the risk of 
the loan in the ASEAN market which has high level of risk and information 
asymmetry issues. This contradicts with the findings in the United States and 
Europe market as developed countries. Lead arranger in those markets applying a 
“certification effect” theory that syndicates the low risk loans to maintain their 
reputation. 
Keyword: Syndicated loans, Information asymmetry, Loan size, Loan maturity, 
Country risk. 

INTRODUCTION
Syndicated loans are very important tools for financing investments of firms in 
a country and consequently for the development of the country as a whole. So far 
many researches of syndicated loans have only focused on the United States and 
Western European countries as the biggest market for the syndicated loans (Dennis 
and Mullineaux, 1999; Armstrong, 2003; Sufi, 2004; Kaya, 2011). Only very few 
studies discussed syndicated loans in emerging markets, such as those of North 
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Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America (Godlewski and Weill, 2008; 
Lasmono, 2010). 
Therefore, this research examined syndicated loans in the ASEAN region, 
because this region boasts of significant potentials with a lot of resources and has 
developed very well in recent years. Consequently, the syndicated loans will be 
very important for the ASEAN to build, develop, and finance its economic 
development. ASEAN is unique and has characteristics which markedly differ from 
those of the United States and Europe, such as its higher agency problems and 
information asymmetry issue. The result of this research will thus be useful to the 
ASEAN business community to better understand about syndicated loans practices 
in this region. 
Syndicated loans are a loan types which consists of two institutions or more 
that jointly grant funds to a borrower. (Armstrong, 2003; Godlewski and Weill, 
2008).In syndicated loans, there is a lead arranger whose manages the whole 
lending process, from preparing information memorandum, to making contracts and 
loan documents, as well as facilitating the administration of the loan (Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000).  
 
Figure 1 
The syndicated loan origination by region 
Source: Dealogic (2011) 
 
Figure 1presents the origin of syndicated loan by region in the period 2006-
2010. It shows that North and South America had the largest amount and proportion 
of syndicated loans proportion in the world. For second place, there was Europe 
that nearly overtook the top position in the last few years. Asia Pacific including 
ASEAN as the emerging market still had a smaller amount of syndicated loans, but 
the volume of the loans in Asia Pacific had the most stable growth if we compared 
with America and Europe. In Asia Pacific, syndicated loans were increasing 
annually from 0.3 trillion in 2006 to 0.5 trillion in 2010. The uniqueness of the 
loans characteristics and the higher risk in the Asian market make this research very 
important to conduct for investors, banks, and governments. 
Adverse Selection occurs because of the lead arranger possesses more 
information about the borrower either due to the previous lending relationship, 
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involving screening, and monitoring efforts. Hence an information asymmetry is 
produced between the lead arranger and participants. Moral hazard problems are 
caused by the lack of effort of the agent to reach the goal of principals. In this case, 
the agent is the lead arranger who delegates the process and principal are 
participant lenders. Participant lenders delegate some monitoring tasks to the lead 
arranger in charge of loan documentation and notably of the enforcement of 
collaterals(Godlewski and Weill, 2008). 
Table 1 
 Literature Review 
Research Paper Loan 
size 
 
Loan 
maturity 
Ticker/ 
listed 
 
Secured/ 
Collateral  
Country 
Risk 
 
Lasmono et al. 2010 + - +  +*** -*** 
Godlewski and 
Weill 
2008 + *** -*** None  None  None  
Dennis and 
Mulieaneux 
2000 + *** + *** +* - None 
Note:Dependent variable: Dummy Syndicated.*= Significant 10%;**= Significant 5%;***= Significant 1%. 
Source: Lasmono et al. (2010); Godlewski and Weill (2008); Dennis and Mullineaux (2000). 
Lasmono et al. (2010) conducted research about syndicated loans in Asia 
over the period 1999-2003.Firstly, they tested the loan size variable using the logit 
model and found an insignificant positive effect of loan size on the decision of 
syndicated loans. Secondly, they tested loan maturity (tenor) using logit model and 
found the result was insignificant negative effect on the decision of syndication. 
Thirdly, they tested the ticker using the logit model and found an insignificant 
positive effect on the decision of syndicated loans. Fourthly, they also examined the 
secured variable using the logit model and the result was 1 % significant positive on 
the decision of syndicated loans. Finally, they also examined the country risk 
variable using the logit model and found the result was 1%significant negative on 
the decision of syndicated loans. 
Godlewski and Weill (2008) carried out research on syndicated loans in 
emerging market (Asia, Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America) for the period between 1990-2006.Firstly, they tested the loan size 
variable with the logit model and found1% significance level with positive 
coefficient for the decision of syndicated loans in all regressions. It is suggesting as 
expected that bigger loans size are tend to be syndicated because of the 
diversification motives and legal lending limit issue. Secondly, they examined the 
loan maturity variable and found the result was1% level of significance with 
negative coefficient for the decision of syndicated loans in all estimations. It shows 
that the longer maturity makes the moral hazard problem through bigger monitoring 
cost. Godlewsky and Weill didn’t include the secured variable because of the 
information is not available for one third of their observations. 
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Dennis and Mullineaux (2000)also researched on syndicated loans in the 
United States over the period 1987-1995. Firstly, they tested the loan size variable 
and found 1% significance level with positive coefficient for the decision of 
syndicated loans. A bigger proportion of the loan tends to be syndicated because of 
the diversification purpose. Secondly, they examined the loan maturity variable and 
found1% level of significance with positive coefficient for the decision of 
syndicated loans. Greater maturity makes the loan will be syndicated by the lead 
arranger, because longer-term loans economize on duplicative monitoring costs for 
the syndication members. Thirdly, they also examined ticker variable and 
found10% level of significance with positive coefficient on the decision of 
syndicated loans. Finally, they also tested secured variable and found the result was 
insignificant with negative coefficient for the decision of syndicated loans in all 
models. It means that unsecured loans are as likely to be syndicated as secured 
loans with collateral. 
Research on syndicated loans has rarely been conducted in the ASEAN 
region, with most of the studies carried out in the United States and Europe. 
Problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are actually more common in 
developing countries such as in the ASEAN region which have driven higher level 
of information asymmetry. 
However, the majority of empirical studies were conducted only in the 
United States and Europe which are developed countries, where the information 
asymmetry problems are not pronounced. Therefore, this research attempts to 
examine and draw insights from syndicated loans in the ASEAN market that has 
more adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Based on the problem identification, this study has some limitations. First, 
this research used the data of loan corporations that were recorded on Deal Scan 
LPC (Loan Pricing Corporation). Second, the data of loan corporations used were 
in US dollar denomination with LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). And 
third, the main focus area of focus for this research were syndicated loans in the 
ASEAN region, except Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, and Myanmar, because 
there are no available data for loan transactions in the latter countries. 
This research will examine the influence of syndicated loans structure 
establishment in ASEAN in the years2006-2010. The research focused on the 
period between 2006-2010 because this is the most recent period where data can be 
obtained. By using the newest data, the researcher can examine more closely 
current economic conditions and future trends. 
Based on the problem identification, its important to state the fundamental 
research questions to be investigated. Those questions can be stated as: What is the 
effect of loan size, loan maturity, public owned companies, secured loans, and 
country risk on the decision of the lead bank to syndicate the loans? 
This study aims to gather and analyze important information for further 
research on the syndicated loans in the ASEAN region. Moreover, this paper is also 
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useful for investors, companies, banks, and governments to have a deeper 
understanding of the variables that affect the decision on syndicated loan structures 
in ASEAN market. This research contributes to the available literature for students 
and lecturers of syndicated loans, especially in the ASEAN region.
The Definition of Syndicated Loans 
According to Godlewski and Weill (2008), syndicated loans are a type of 
loans that involve more than one bank or financial institutions which gives funds to 
the borrower. In syndicated loans there is a lender(s) acting as the lead arranger 
while others act as participant lenders that have different roles and functions 
individually (Sufi, 2004). The lead arranger establishes a relationship with the 
borrower and discusses the terms of loan agreement among the members. The lead 
bank then grants a share of the loan, carries out the loan requirement processes, and 
receives fees to look for other participants to join the syndication. 
The Purposes of Syndicated Loans 
Banks have several purposes to conduct a syndication loans. First of all, 
banks want to make a diversification of loan portfolios, so that they can reduce the 
risk of loans default. This statement is consistent with Jones et al.(2000), who stated 
that the syndicated loan was used to achieve a diversification on the banking book 
of lenders and to take benefits of funding if they act as the lead arranger. Second, 
banks want to avoid domination and exposure of single name constitution which are 
prohibited by bank regulation in certain countries.  
Third, syndication loans generate fee income of origination capabilities in 
certain types of transactions to fund loans (Godlewski and Weill, 2008). The fourth 
purpose was also expressed in Jones, et al. (2000) according to certification effect 
theory, that syndicated loans can increase the lead arranger’s reputation in the eyes 
of borrower in conducting the formation, distribution, and service provision of 
loans syndication in big numbers.  
Syndicated Loans in Emerging Markets 
Godlewski and Weill (2008) examined the research about the syndicated 
loans in the emerging markets. They divided the emerging markets into four 
geographical areas: Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Latin 
America. They observed that Asia has the greatest market for syndicated loans 
among the emerging markets, representing more than 50%of the volume and issues 
of syndicated loans in all periods. Based on the cited journal paper, this research 
aimed to conduct further research on syndicated loans in the ASEAN market, being 
a high potential market, with many of developing countries belonging to it have the 
potential to grow enormously and need huge amount of money to fund their 
development projects. 
 
If the ASEAN were considered as a single country, it would rank as the 
ninth largest economy in the world, behind the United States, China, Japan, 
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Germany, France, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Thus, the ASEAN is a 
very interesting region to research on in terms of its syndicated loans that will 
enable the financing of its firms and developing the member countries. 
Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry could become a problem in syndicated loans 
process. Information asymmetry occurs due to the different levels of mastery of 
information between two parties involved in the loan agreement. It can occur 
between lenders and borrowers, or between lead arrangers and participant lenders. 
One party may have more information that the other party doesn't know.  
In this situation, the lead arranger will have more information compared to 
the participant lenders, because the lead arranger will have bigger role and access to 
the borrower data, such as information about the relationship of the borrower with 
their supplier and customer, ability of borrower to overcome the economic changes, 
and other information that may not be stated in the borrowers’ financial statement 
(Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2004). This issue has a negative impact on 
credit risk portfolio of the lender participant (Godlewski and Weill, 2008). 
Furthermore, information asymmetry on syndicated loans can also cause 
some agency problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard (Godlewski and 
Weill, 2008). Adverse selection happen when the lead arranger cannot distinguish 
between the high quality and low quality of loans, so they unintentionally do not 
conduct high quality of loans but they end up with the low quality loans. This can 
be attributed to the different levels of mastery of information between the lead 
arranger and the borrower (Marciano, 2008; Jones, et al., 2000).  
In syndicated loans, moral hazard problems are caused by several factors. 
First there is a discrepancy of goals to achieve by principals and agents. Second, 
information asymmetry results in the principal not knowing the works of the agent 
and being unable to measure the agent’s skills and ability. In this case, the agent 
does not carry out the principal’s request, as it should be. Moral hazard behavior 
will often appear on the monitoring activities for the syndicated loan. Participant 
lenders will delegate monitoring tasks on borrower companies to the lead arranger, 
because the cost to carry out these tasks is quite high for the lenders. 
Although so many tasks are delegated to the lead arranger and the lead 
arranger has an authority to represent participant lenders in dealing with the 
borrower. The lead arranger can feel the lack of an incentive to implement the 
monitoring on the borrower when it’s compared to the case of regular loans 
(Godlewski and Weill, 2008). This can occur because the costs of monitoring of the 
borrower by the lead arranger does not differ from the case of loans that are not 
syndicated, but the benefits received by the lead arranger is smaller because they 
are distributed to all of the participant lenders (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; 
Steffen, 2005). When the lead arranger’s monitoring task is not investigated and 
controlled by participant lenders, the lead arranger creates the moral hazard 
(Godlewski and Weill, 2008). 
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In emerging markets like the ASEAN region, information asymmetry has 
become a major problem for decisions on syndicating the loan. Marciano (2008) 
conducted research in Indonesia, an ASEAN member country. It is worth noting 
that Indonesia has serious problems in finance regulation systems, monitoring 
systems, and also the lacks rating schemes for private debts. The culture and habits 
of the majority of ASEAN tend to cause the moral hazard problems, such as 
corruption and acts of bribery (Lasmono et al., 2010). Therefore, the information 
asymmetry problems in ASEAN are greater than in the developed countries such as 
country in Europe and United States  
EMPIRICAL RESEARCHES 
Relationship of loan size to decision on syndicating the loan 
Increasing the amount of loan is expected to positively influence the decision to 
syndicate a loan. Indeed, the motives to diversify loan portfolios and follow 
regulations are more likely to have effects for larger loans. Lasmono et al. (2010) 
tested the loan size variable (amount) using the logit model and discovered an 
insignificant positive effect on decision of syndicated loans.
Godlewski and Weill (2008) also investigated syndicated loans in emerging 
markets for the period between 1990 to 2006. They tested the loan size variable 
with the Logit model and discovered a significant positive effect on the decision of 
syndicated loans. Loan size showed positive and significant trends in all 
regressions, suggesting as expected that larger loans are more likely to be 
syndicated in accordance with the diversification of loan portfolios motives and 
legal lending limit regulation that limited the amount of loan given by a single 
lender. 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) also examined the loan size variable with the 
Logit model and obtained 1% significance level with positive coefficient to the 
decision on syndicated loans. If the loan size variable increases, a larger proportion 
of a loan is likely to be syndicated, reflecting either discretionary or regulatory 
driven motives for diversification. 
H1: There is a higher effect of loan size on the decision of the lead bank to 
syndicate the loans. 
Relationship of loan maturity to decision syndicates the loan. 
Researches on relationship of loan maturity to syndicated loans provide mixed 
evidence. Some studies found a positive effect of loan maturity on syndicated loan 
decision, such as that of Dennis and Mullineaux, (2000) primarily. They conducted 
the research on syndicated loans in the United States over the period 1987-1995, 
testing the loan maturity variable with the Logit model and finding a significant 
positive effect on syndication decision.  
According to Diamond (1984), frequent renewals also increase the monitoring 
costs for all syndicated loans. He had proven how the avoidance of duplicative 
monitoring costs helps provide a rationale for the existence of financial 
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intermediaries. Subsequently the majority of syndicated loans involve variable-rate 
pricing which reduces interest rate risk. The lead arranger would prefer longer-term 
claims on the borrower’s cash flows to avoid high monitoring costs. Greater 
maturity is also generally associated with a greater risk of loan default, which 
entices the lead bank to syndicate the loan for the diversification motive. 
In contrast, some researches provide evidence on the negative effect of maturity 
on syndicated loan decision such as that of Godlewski and Weill (2008). They 
conducted the research on syndicated loans in emerging market (Asia, Middle East, 
Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America) for the period between 1990 to 
2006. Godlewski and Weill (2008) tested the loan maturity variable with the Logit 
model and found a significant negative effect on decision for syndicated loans. 
They argued that higher maturity is correlated with higher monitoring costs as long-
term loans incur control of covenant costs. As a result, the moral hazard problem 
increased and thus reduces the attractiveness for participant lenders, resulting in an 
overall negative effect on the syndicated loan decision.  
Lasmono et al. (2010) also found a negative effect of loan maturity on the 
decision of syndication of loans, but it was statistically insignificant. They 
conducted the research in Asia over the period 1999-2003. Lasmono et al. (2010) 
tested loan maturity (tenor) using the logit model, resulting insignificantly negative 
effect on the decision of syndication. 
H2: There is a lower effect of loan maturity on the decision of the lead bank to 
syndicate the loans. 
Relationship of public or non-public company to decision on syndicating the 
loan
Ticker is the variable that indicates whether the borrower is a publicly listed 
company or not. The loan with ticker, which involves more transparent information 
(i.e., that easier to access, process, and interpret by the lender) are more likely to be 
syndicated than the loan without ticker, because the information will be difficult to 
observe and interpret. 
Lasmono et al.(2010) found an insignificant positive effect on the decision 
of syndicated loans. But Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) found a significant positive 
effect on the decision of syndicated loans. They argued that loans from listed 
companies are more likely to be syndicated since these borrowers involve more 
transparent information. Increasing on the information transparency also reduces 
the monitoring cost, because the lender can easily access the company’s financial 
statement and corporate action report. 
H3: There is a higher effect of the public owned companies on the decision of 
the lead bank to syndicate the loans. 
Relationship of Secured Loan to the Decision to Syndicate the Loan 
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Secured loan means that the loan has collateral. Collateral is a borrower's 
guarantee of a specific property to a lender, to secure repayment of the loan. 
Lasmono Et al. (2008) examined syndicated loans in Asia over the period 
1999-2003. They tested the secured variable with the Logit model and found a 
significant positive effect on the decision for syndicated loans. The collateral serves 
as a protection to a lender against a borrower's default, i.e., if the borrower fails to 
pay the principal and interest under the terms of a loan obligation. Collaterals 
contribute in mitigating the agency problems associated with syndicated loans.  
Secured loans show a good signal of borrower’s creditworthiness through their 
willingness to offer collateral. Futhermore, the quality of the lenders’ monitoring 
activity becomes less important (Bester, 1985; and Besanko and Thakor, 1987). 
Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) tested the secured variable with the logit 
model and found an in significance negative effect on the decision of syndication. 
Berger and Udell (1990); and Rajan and Winton (1995) argued that secured loans 
mean riskier loans. They found that providing collateral is more likely to be 
observed in loans to firms that require monitoring. If the main purpose of the 
collateral is to solve moral hazard problems, then borrowers who need to be 
monitored closely will present more collateral to avoid the monitoring activity 
imposed on them. In this case, according to “certification effect” theory it may be 
ineffective to give incentive to each bank to monitor by syndicating the loan. These 
points suggest that collateral has negative effect to the decision of lead arranger to 
syndicate the loan. But in the other hand, Marciano (2008) expressed that the lead 
arranger will tend to syndicate the loan when the loan is secured due to the risk 
diversification motives. 
H4: There is a higher effect of loan secured on the decision of the lead bank to 
syndicate the loans. 
Relationship of country risk to the decision on syndicating the loan 
Credit risk is the risk caused by the incapability of a borrower to do stick to 
their obligation that is written in the loan agreement contracts. (Jorion, 2002).As a 
result of loan contract violation, the loan can not be repaid, or there are delays in 
the payment of the loan. This situation is due to the uncertainties created in lending 
environment (Hanafi, 2009). Damodaran (2003) also expressed the same statement 
that the credit risk will increase in line with increasing business risks faced by the 
borrower based on their locations. 
According to Case and Fair (2005), the aggregate behavior of the micro 
economy will be reflected on the movement of the macro economy. The 
uncertainties of the lending environment are reflected in the credit risk of a country, 
which in turn affect the credit risk of borrowers in that country. It can be concluded 
that the higher the credit risk of a country, which indicates high uncertainty in its 
business environment, will lead to the higher credit risk of its borrowers.
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Country risk is an index measuring a risk of country based on its credit risk 
and the political risk of each country. Scale country risk is expressed on a scale 
from 0 to7 scale, where 0 indicates the lowest country risk level for countries and 7 
indicates the highest country risk level. 
Previous researches on the effect of country risk on the loan structure provide 
mixed evidence. High country risk reflects the high uncertainty of the business 
environment where the borrower does business. It is caused by the lead arranger 
having a bigger responsibility to monitor the borrower (Godlewski and Weill, 
2008). Thus high country risk will make the lead arranger decide not to syndicate 
the loans. However, Khrawish, Siam, and Jaradat (2010) found the opposite result, 
that participants will be more interested in loans in emerging markets or countries 
that have a higher risk. Consequently, the lead arranger will tend more to syndicate 
the loan. Lasmono et al., 2008 also investigated syndicated loans in Asia over the 
period 1999-2003. They tested the country risk variable using the logit model and 
found a significant negative effect on the decision for syndicated loans. 
H5: There is a lower effect of the country risk on the decision of the lead bank 
to syndicate the loans. 
VARIABLES AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 
The dependent variable of this research is SYNDICATED which is a 
dummy variable that showing whether the loan is syndicated or not. Five 
independent variables are employed here, namely: LOGSIZE, MATURITY, 
TICKER, SECURED and COUNTRYRISK.  Moreover, the COUNTRY variable is 
used as a control variable in this model. COUNTRY can stand for Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand or Vietnam. 
The pattern of relationships between dependent variable and the 
independent variables is of the asymmetry multivariate types, because there are 
several independent variables that affect the dependent variable. 
 
LOGSIZE  is a variable indicates the log size of the loan in 
U.S. dollar-denomination. 
MATURITY is a variable indicates the maturity of the loan in 
units of months. 
TICKER is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the 
company is listed in the stock market, or 0 if 
not.  
SECURED is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if loans have 
collateral, or has a value of 0 for loans without 
collateral. 
COUNTRYRISK is an index measuring a country's risk as 
measured by credit risk and political risk of the 
country. The index scale is between 0-7. 0 
indicates that the country with lowest risk and 7 
is the highest risk. 
COUNTRY is a dummy variable that show the location of 
borrower, which can be located in Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand or Vietnam. 
SYNDICATED is a dummy variable, equal to1 if the loan is 
syndicated loan, or has the value of 0 if the loan 
is not syndicated. 
DATA TYPES AND DATA SOURCES 
This research uses secondary data for the data collection method, which 
cover 223loan transactions in US dollar denomination with LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offered Rate)in the ASEAN region. The data come from seven ASEAN 
countries, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam, in the period of 2006–2010. Excluded are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
and Myanmar, because data are unavailable in these countries. Secondary data in 
this paper is collected from the Reuters Dealscan database, which provides the data 
per transaction in US dollar that recorded on Loans Pricing Cooperation (LPC). 
Dealscan LPC is a private cooperation initiative that collects loans information for 
institutional clients.  
The population studied here consists of all loans transactions in the ASEAN 
region over the period 2006 to 2010 in US Dollar denomination with LIBOR that 
are recorded in the LPC (Loan Pricing Corporations) of the Reuters Dealscan 
database. The population characteristics of the borrower corporation are the types 
of syndicated loans. Samples are from the entire borrower corporation in seven 
countries in ASEAN region which are private corporations that belong to the 
population consisting of 223 loan transactions. Levels of measurement used in this 
research are nominal and ratio level measurements.
DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE 
Data collection procedure begins with collecting all transactions data from 
the ASEAN corporate loans in the Dealscan database, with recorded 121.872 loan 
transactions in ASEAN from 1985 until 2010. From the existing data, this research 
focused on the following characteristics: (1) U.S. dollar-denomination loans, (2) 
loan contracts in the period2006 to 2010, (3) loans with LIBOR base rate (4) loans 
located in the 7 ASEAN countries specified, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Transactions with incomplete 
information will be eliminated from the sample. After the following procedures, the 
sample has aremaining223 transactions, which are the core data from the period 
2006-2010 in US Dollar denomination. 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
The Logitmodel is represented by the following equation: 
SYNDICATED = ȕ0  + ȕ1 LOGSIZE + ȕ2 MATURITY + ȕ3 TICKER + ȕ4 SECURED 
+ ȕ5 COUNTRY RISK + ȕ6Indonesia + ȕ7 Malaysia + ȕ8 
Philippines + ȕ9 Singapore + ȕ10 Thailand + ȕ11 Vietnam. + e 
Note: Laos is a base value of a dummy variable for COUNTRY. 
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Syndicated = Syndicated loan of company i on t period 
Logsize = Logarithm of loan size of company i on t period 
Maturity = Loan maturity of company i on t period 
Ticker = Listed/public status of company i on t period  
Secured  = Existence of loan collateral of company i on t period 
Country Risk = Country risk of company i on t period 
Indonesia = Company i located in Indonesia on t period 
Malaysia = Company i located in Malaysia on t period 
Philippines = Company i located in the Philippines on t period 
Singapore  = Company i located in Singapore on t period 
Thailand  = Company i located in Thailand on t period 
Vietnam = Company i located in Vietnam on t period 
ȕ1 - ȕ11 = Regression coefficient  
e = Standard error 
 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This research employs the logit model to analyze data; logit model is a 
regression model for analyzing dependent variables with possible values between 0 
and 1 (Winarno, 2009). There are two kinds of the logit models: model for 
individual data (Logit), and model for group of data (G-logit).The individual data  
The goodness of fit is the tested to measure the quality of the model. It can 
be tested by using three methods; there are Hosmer Lemenshaw, McFadden R 
Square, and Andrew Statistics methods.  
The Hosmer Lemenshaw test for goodness of fit and assesses whether or not 
the observed event rates match expected event rates in subgroups of the model 
population. This test identifies subgroups as the passes of fitted risk values. Models 
for which expected and observed event rates in subgroups are similar are 
considered to be well calibrated. If the Chi-square probability of Hosmer 
Lemenshaw is bigger than 0.05, then the null hypothesis accepted. This means that 
the model is able to predict the value of an observation and match the observation 
data (Ghozali, 2009). 
The McFadden R Square is a test to measure the goodness of fit in the Logit 
model. The higher the resulting value of the McFadden R Square the better is the 
quality of the model. The McFadden R Square result represents the influence of all 
independent variables on the dependent variable. 
The Andrew statistic is another test to gauge the goodness of fit of the 
model. In this model, the null hypothesis states that the model is correctly specified, 
and the alternative hypothesis, that model is incorrectly specified. Using the 
asymptotical Chi-square distribution, this test evaluates the specification model.  If 
the Chi-square probability of the Andrew’s test is lower than 0.01,then the null 
hypothesis is rejected. In contrast, if the Chi-square probability in the test is higher 
than 0.01, then the null hypothesis is accepted, indicating that the model is correctly 
specified. 
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Expectation And Prediction Test measures the accuracy of the model. The 
higher the percentage of the correctness of the result, the better is the accuracy of 
the model. 
Robustness check is a method to gauge the robustness of the model by 
comparing the main model with another model. In this research, the Logit model as 
the main model is compared with the probit model. 
Statistical Data Description 
Table 4.1 shows the 223 loan transactions in the ASEAN region over the 
period 2006-2010. These transactions are divided into two categories. First category 
is syndicated loans and second category is non-syndicated loans. The 174 
syndicated loan transactions comprised 78.03% of the total of 223 transactions; 
with only 49 loans or 21.97% of the total were non-syndicated loans. 
The composition of borrowers indicates that the number of borrowers listed 
in the capital market (ticker) was less than those not listed in the capital market. As 
many as 135 from the total of 223 companies, equivalent to 60.54%, were 
borrowers not listed in the capital market. In contrast, 88 companies, equivalent to 
39.46%, were borrowers listed in the capital market. For borrowers listed in the 
capital market, there are 71 companies used a form of syndication representing 
80.68% of the total 88 companies listed in the stock market, and only 17 companies 
did not conduct a syndicated loan (19.32%).The proportion of the borrowers that 
are not listed in the capital market indicates that the majority of borrowers also 
conducted syndicated loans. There were 103 companies not listed in the stock 
market which conducted syndicated loans, amounting to 76.29% of the total 135 
companies not listed, and only 32 companies did not make syndicated loans 
(23.71%).  
From the total of 223 loan transactions, only 34 transactions were secured 
loans (15.25%), and 189 transactions or 84.75% were not secured loans, i.e., loans 
without collateral and guarantors. From the total of 34 secured loans, 32 or 94.12% 
had a form of syndication, with only two loans or 5.88% as non-syndicated loans. 
For the non-secured loans, 142 loans or 75.13% had a syndication form, and 47 
loans (24.87%) without a syndication form. 
Considering country distribution, Indonesia had the most loan transactions 
with 77 transactions, 60 of which (77.92%) were syndicated and 17 (22.08%) were 
not. Singapore followed with 58 loans (46 syndicated loans and 12 non-syndicated 
loans), then Malaysia with 28 loans (24 syndicated and 4 non-syndicated), the 
Philippines with 28 loans (22 syndicated and 6 non-syndicated), Vietnam with 17 
loans (13 syndicated and 4 non-syndicated), Thailand with 12 loans (8 syndicated 
and 4 non-syndicated), and last was Laos with only 3 loans (1 syndicated and 2 
non-syndicated). Almost all of the ASEAN countries had more syndicated loans 
than non-syndicated, except Laos that had more non-syndicated loans. The size of 
the 223 loans had a mean value of USD 225.49 millions, with median of USD 130 
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millions, maximum value of USD 6,000 millions, minimum value of USD 6.4 
millions, and standard deviation of USD 450.05 millions. Syndicated loans had a 
mean value of USD 240.42 million, median of USD 130 millions, maximum value 
of USD 6,000 millions, minimum value of USD 6,404 millions, and standard 
deviation of USD 501.34 millions. For non-syndicated loans, the mean value was 
USD 172.48 million, with median of USD 140 millions, maximum value of USD 
750 millions, minimum value of USD 6,400 million, and standard deviation of 
USD 164.99 millions. 
 
All Syndicated 
loans
Non syndicated 
loans
Syndicated 
loans (%) 
Non-syndicated 
loans (%) 
Number of loans 223 174 49 78.03% 21.97% 
Syndicated loans 174 174 0 100% - 
Non syndicated loans 49 0 49 - 100% 
Listed/ticker 88 71 17 80.68% 19.32% 
Non listed/ticker 135 103 32 76.29% 23.71% 
Secured 34 32 2 94.12% 5.88% 
Non secured 189 142 47 75.13% 24.87% 
Country        
Brunei 0 0 0 - - 
Myanmar 0 0 0 - - 
Cambodia  0 0 0 - - 
Indonesia  77 60 17 77.92% 22.08% 
Laos 3 1 2 33.33% 66.67% 
Malaysia 28 24 4 85.71% 14.29% 
The Philippines  28 22 6 78.57% 21.43% 
Singapore 58 46 12 79.31% 20.69% 
Thailand 12 8 4 66.67% 33.33% 
Vietnam 17 13 4 76.47% 23.53% 
Loan Size        
Mean 225,492,588.7 240,421,741 172,478,864.2 - - 
Median 130,000,000 130,000,000 140,000,000 - - 
Max 6,000,000,000 6,000,000,000 750,000,000 - - 
Min 6,400,000 6,404,672.84 6,400,000 - - 
Std. dev. 450,048,983.2 501,336,747.9 164,995,424 - - 
Log Loan Size        
Mean 8.10089491 8.118289012 8.0391281 - - 
Median 8.113943352 8.113943352 8.146128036 - - 
Max 9.77815125 9.77815125 8.875061263 - - 
Min 6.806179974 6.80649695 6.806179974 - - 
Std. dev. 0.444603249 0.442214995 0.452141869 - - 
Loan Maturity         
Mean 56.43497758 51.91954 72.4694 - - 
Median 48 48 60 - - 
Max 318 180 318 - - 
Min 1 1 1 - - 
Std. dev. 43.54446868 33.40337 66.4207 - - 
Country Risk        
Mean 3.192825112 3.16091954 3.30612245 - - 
Table 4: Statistical Description of Corporate Loans
In The ASEAN Over The Period 2006-2010 
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Table 5.1 
The Logit Model Result of All Loans Samples in ASEAN 2006-2010 
 
The maturity of the 223 loan transactions had a mean of 56.43 months, with 
median of 48 months, maximum maturity of 318 months, minimum maturity of one 
month, and the standard deviation was 43.54 months. Syndicated loans had a 
shorter maturity than non-syndicated loans, with 174 of syndicated loans having a 
mean of 51.9 months, median of 48 months, maximum maturity of 180 months, 
minimum maturity of one month, and the standard deviation was 33.4 months. On 
the other hand, the maturity of non-syndicated loans had a mean value of 72.47 
months, median of 60 months, maximum maturity of 318 months, minimum 
maturity of one month, and the standard deviation was 66.42 months. 
Country risk for all loan transactions had a mean of 3.19, median of 4, 
maximum point of 7, minimum point of 0, and standard deviation of 2.19. For 
syndicated loans, the country risk had a mean point of 3.16, median of also 4, 
maximum country risk of 7, minimum point of 0, and the standard deviation was 
2.19.On the other hand, for non-syndicated loans, the country risk had mean of 
3.31, median of 4, maximum point of 7, and minimum point of 0, and had standard 
deviation of 2.17. 
RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
   
 
Variable Coefficient Z-Statistic 
C -20.88572 -3.224823 
LOGSIZE 0.538970 1.382552 
MATURITY -0.010435*** -2.873972 
TICKER 0.220250 0.545566 
SECURED 1.821984** 2.414519 
COUNTRYRISK 2.383293*** 2.900182 
INDONESIA 5.777644*** 3.112643 
PHILIPPINES 7.362823*** 2.860528 
VIETNAM 8.293649*** 3.156415 
THAILAND 10.62418*** 3.018819 
MALAYSIA 14.03524*** 3.289681 
SINGAPORE 18.30335*** 3.123563 
Note: Dependent variable: syndicated; * = Significant 10%; ** = Significant 5%; *** = Significant 1%.Source: 
Appendix I (Eviews 7 for Windows) 
Overall significance of all variables is measured by the Log likelihood Ratio 
Statistics. The log likelihood ratio in this model showed a positive coefficient 
Median 4 4 4 - - 
Max 7 7 7 - - 
Min 0 0 0 - - 
Std. dev. 2.186371094 2.19562657 2.17182797 - - 
Source:Dealscandatabase,LPC(LoanPricingCorporation)
ͳͲ

ǣͻ͹ͺǦͻ͹ͻǦͻͻ͵͸ͷǦ͹Ǧͺ ͳ͵ͺͺ
(31.94217) and significance level of 1%. (0.000779). This means that all 
independent variables had significant effects on the dependent variable, Syndicated. 
The results show that the log size variable does not confirm the H1, it has 
insignificant result with a positive coefficient. These findings are inline with 
Lasmono et al. (2010) that conducted the research in Asia markets. The 
insignificant result is due to the high variance of loan size data. The high 
information asymmetry problems in the ASEAN, enhances the lead arranger to 
syndicate the loans in all variety of sizes, wheter it is in small proportion or big 
proportion. 
The result of maturity variable confirms the H2, showing a negative coefficient 
and significance level of 1%. Sofie (2012); Lasmono et al. (2010); and Goldwesky 
and Weill (2008) also supports these findings. In the case of the loan maturity, the 
lead arranger will tend not to syndicate the loan when the maturity of the loan is 
longer. The high monitoring cost of the loans will happen because of the bigger 
moral hazard problems, such that this situation will not be attractive for participant 
lenders. Loans with shorter maturity period scan be a solution to reduce the 
potential information asymmetry issues and moral hazard problems. 
The result for the ticker variable does not confirm the H3, i.e., it has 
insignificant result with a positive coefficient. These findings are consistent with 
Lasmono Et al. (2010) who also found an insignificant result with positive 
coefficient on ticker variable. The imbalanced data between public companies and 
non public companies cause the insignificance of this result. Additionally, the high 
information asymmetry and moral hazard problems in the ASEAN market makes 
the lead arranger tends to syndicate all loans whether the borrower is listed 
company or not. 
The Logit results for the secured variable in the model is confirm the H4, 
showing significant results at the 5% level with a positive coefficient. These 
indicate that, there is a significant relationship between the secured variable to the 
decision of syndicating the loan, and there is a direct relationship between the 
secured variable and the syndicated variable. These are consistent with the findings 
of Lasmono et al. (2010). The lead arrangers prefer to syndicate the loan when 
borrowers include guarantees in the loan contract, and do not tend to syndicate in 
the absence of guarantees. Berger and Udell (1990) argued that loans with collateral 
are typically associated with riskier loans, because of the “observed-risk 
hypothesis” which means that riskier borrowers who need to be monitored closely 
will present more collateral to avoid the monitoring activity imposed on them. 
The results show that the country risk variable does not confirm the H5, it has 
significant result at the1 %level with a positive coefficient. These test results of 
country risk variable have a positive coefficient value, indicating that loans tend to 
be syndicated in a country with high country risk and do not tend to be syndicated 
when the level of a country risk is low. This means that the lead arranger will 
conduct syndicated loans for borrowers who are located in a country with a higher 
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level of risk, because the lead arranger wants to distribute the risk of the loan 
among the participant members to circumvent the high risk. This type of behavior 
demonstrated by the lead arranger also supports the theory proposed by Lyland and 
Pyle (1977). The lead arranger will diversify their portfolio risk when faced with 
the problem of loans having a high business risk. 
 
 
Table 5: Result Review 
Research Paper Loan 
size 
 
Loan 
maturity 
Ticker/ 
listed 
 
Secured/ 
Collateral  
Country Risk 
 
Bandono et al. 2012 + -*** + +** +*** 
Lasmono et al. 2010 + - +  + *** - *** 
Godlewski and 
Weill 
2008 + *** - *** None  None  None  
Dennis and 
Mulieaneux 
2000 + *** + *** +* - None 
Note:Dependent variable: Dummy Syndicated.* = Significant 10%; ** = Significant 5%;*** = Significant 1% 
Test of Goodness of Fit 
Hosmer Lemenshaw test is used for goodness of fit and assesses whether or 
not the observed event rates match the expected event rates in subgroups of the 
model population. The value of the Hosmer Lemenshaw test in this model is 
10.1136 with the probability Chi-Square (8) being 0.2571 (Appendix II). The 
probability Chi-square of this model is bigger than 0.05, meaning that the null 
hypothesis is accepted and this model is able to predict the value of an observation 
and match with the observation data. 
 
McFadden R Square is a test to measures goodness of fit in the Logit model. 
The higher the McFadden R Square value, the better is the quality of the model. 
McFadden R Square result in this model is 0.136012 (Appendix I). This mean that 
with changes in the dependent variable, the syndicated variable can be explained by 
all independent variables (log size, maturity, ticker, secured, country risk, and 
country variables) as much as 13.6012 %.However, the rest as much as 86.3988 
%,is influenced by other variables outside the model. 
Andrew statistic is another test of the goodness of fit. In this model, Andrew 
statistic value reaches 18.853 with the probability Chi-Square (10) being 0.0422 
(Appendix II). With a significance level of 1%, the null hypothesis in Andrew’s test 
is not rejected, indicating that the model used in this study is correctly specified. 
Hence, the model used in this study is well specified and efficient. 
Expectation and Prediction Test 
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Table 6: Robustness Check Using The Probit Model 
Expectation and prediction test measures the accuracy of the model. The 
higher the value of “Correct percentage”, the better is the model’s acurracy. The 
correct results for the prediction test in this model amount to 178 from the total of 
223 total transactions, representing 79.82% (Appendix III).This value also stands 
for the accuracy of model estimation with actual data. 
Robustness Check 
Robustness Check is method to gauges the robustness of the model. This 
research compared the main model with the probit model. The robustness check 
yielded results shown in Table 5.2 using the Eviews7 software for Windows.  
Similar results were obtained with respect to the main model, Logit. This 
means that the model in this research is robust and there is no significant difference 
between the Logit and the probit model. The only difference lies in the secured 
variable. In the Logit model, secured has a positive coefficient at 5% level of 
significance, but in the probit model it has a positive coefficient at 1% level of 
significance.
  
 
Note: Dependent variable: syndicated; * = Significant 10%; ** = Significant 5%; *** = Significant 1%. 
Source: Appendix IV (Eviews 7 for Windows) 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this research is to know the relationship of the loan size, 
maturity, ticker, secured and country risk variables to the decision of the lead 
arranger to syndicated loans. 
Variable Coefficient Z-Statistic 
C -12.07980 -3.369165 
LOGSIZE 0.301128 1.355889 
MATURITY -0.006051*** -2.908646 
TICKER 0.129579 0.580940 
SECURED 0.990049*** 2.703178 
COUNTRYRISK 1.383617*** 3.220002 
INDONESIA 3.426022*** 3.275006 
PHILIPPINES 4.267611*** 3.209874 
VIETNAM 4.907018*** 3.456580 
THAILAND 6.233198*** 3.314367 
MALAYSIA 8.247300*** 3.645082 
SINGAPORE 10.70159*** 3.473110 
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According to the findings, it concludes that the lead arranger tends to syndicate 
the loans for diversify the risk of the loans in the ASEAN market, which has high 
level of risk and information asymmetry issues. This contradicts with the findings 
in the United States and Europe market as developed countries. Lead arrangers in 
those markets confirm with a “certification effect” theory that syndicates the low 
risk loans to maintain their reputation in the eyes of participant banks. Overall 
significance of all variables is measured by using Log likelihood Ratio Statistics 
and shows positive coefficient at the 1% level of significance. It means that all 
independent variables have significant effects on the dependent variable, 
Syndicated. 
The goodness of fit of this model tested using three methods shows that: 
Firstly, the probability Chi-square of Hosmer Lemenshaw is bigger than 0.05, so 
the null hypothesis accepted. The model is able to predict the value of an 
observation and match with the observation data. Secondly, the McFadden R 
Square indicates that changes in syndicated variable can be explained by all 
independent variables (log size, maturity, ticker, secured, country risk, and Country 
variables) by up to 13.6012 %.Thirdly, with a significance level of 1%, the null 
hypothesis in Andrew’s test is not rejected, indicating that the model is correctly 
specified and efficient. 
The expectation and prediction test in this model shows that the accuracy of 
the model estimation with actual data is 79.82% correct. The result of robustness 
check using the probit model in this research shows a similar result with the main 
model, Logit. It means that the model is robust and there is no significant difference 
between those two models. 
Recommendation 
The lead arrangers should consider maturity, secured, and country risk 
factors before deciding on the form of the loan, whether to conduct syndication or 
not. They also should consider the problem of information asymmetry and moral 
hazards before conducting a syndicated loan, because reducing these problems can 
make the participant lenders more interested and attracted to join the syndication. 
The participant members of syndicated loans should know the risk of the loan and 
the conditions of borrowing before joining a syndicated loans form. Companies or 
borrowers should consider including the collateral and shortening the maturity of 
the loan if they want to borrow huge amounts of loan, so that the proposal can be 
accepted by all members of the loan syndication. 
For students and researchers carrying out further study on syndicated loans, 
there are some limitations in this research due to the short period of time covered in 
the study and the small sample used, owing to the limited data available in the 
ASEAN region. For further research, it is suggested to make this period longer and 
observe more samples from different countries outside the ASEAN region.  
Furthermore, a limitation of this research lies in the Mc-Fadden R Square being 
relatively low in the Logit test model. This is because there are other variables that 
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have significant influence on the model but were not included in this research, such 
as loan characteristic, country’s and company’s variable. Therefore, further 
research on syndicated loans should consider taking into account the variables.
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1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1.1 Type area
The text should fit exactly into the type area of 187 
u 272 mm (7.36" u 10.71"). For correct settings of 
margins in the Page Setup dialog box (File menu) 
see Table 1. 
1.2 Typefont, typesize and spacing
Use Times New Roman 12 point size and 13 point 
line spacing (Standard;text tag). Use roman type ex-
cept for the headings (Heading tags), parameters in 
mathematics (not for log, sin, cos, ln, max., d (in dx), 
etc), Latin names of species and genera in botany 
and zoology and the titles of journals and books 
which should all be in italics. Never use bold, except 
to denote vectors in mathematics. Never underline 
any text. Use the small font (10 points on 11 points) 
for tables (Table tags), figure captions (Figure cap-
tion tag) and the references (Reference text tag).
Never use letterspacing and never use more than 
one space after each other.
2 GETTING STARTED
2.1 Preparing the new file with the correct template
Copy the template file B2ProcA4.dot (if you print on 
A4 size paper) or B2ProcLe.dot (for Letter size pa-
per) to the template directory. This directory can be 
found by selecting the Tools menu, Options and then 
by tabbing the File Locations. When the Word pro-
gramme has been started open the File menu and 
choose New. Now select the template B2ProcA4.dot 
or B2ProcLe.dot (see above). Start by renaming the 
document by clicking Save As in the menu Files. 
Name your file as follows: First three letters of the 
file name should be the first three letters of the last 
name of the first author, the second three letters 
should be the first letter of the first three words of 
the title of the paper (e.g. this paper: balpcc.doc). 
Now you can type your paper, or copy the old ver-
sion of your paper onto this new formated file.
2.2 Copying old text onto new file
Open your old file and the new file. Switch between 
these two with the Window menu. Select all text of 
the old file (excluding title, authors, affiliations and 
abstract) and paste onto bottom of new file, after 
having deleted the word INTRODUCTION (see also 
section 2.5). Check the margin setting (Page Setup 
dialog box in File menu) and column settings (see 
Table 1 for correct settings). After this copy the texts 
which have to be placed in the frames (see sections 
2.3 and 2.4 ). In order to avoid disruption of the text 
and frames, copy these texts paragraph by paragraph 
without including the first word (which includes the 
Preparing a two column paper with MS Word for Windows
A.T. Balkema & G. Westers
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B. Unknown
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Table 1.  Margin settings for A4 size paper and letter size
paper.______________________________________________
Setting A4 size paper Letter size paper____________ _____________
cm inches cm inches______________________________________________
Top 1.2 0.47" 0.32      0.13"
Bottom 1.3 0.51" 0.42 0.17"
Left 1.15 0.45" 1.45 0.57"
Right 1.15 0.45" 1.45 0.57"
All other 0.0 0.0" 0.0 0.0"
Column width* 9.0 3.54" 9.0 3.54"
Column spacing* 0.7 0.28" 0.7 0.28"_____________________________________________
*  Column dialog box in Format menu.
old tag). It is best to first retype the first words man-
ually and then to paste the correct text behind. When 
the new file contains all the text, the old tags in the 
text should be replaced by the new Balkema tags 
(see section 3). Before doing this apply automatic 
formatting (AutoFormat in Format menu).
2.3 Title, author and affiliation frame
Place the cursor on the T of Title at the top of your 
newly named file and type the title of the paper in 
lower case (no caps except for proper names). The 
title should not be longer than 75 characters). Delete 
the word Title (do not delete the paragraph end). 
Place the cursor on the A of A.B.Author(s) and type 
the name of the first author (first the initials and then 
the last name). If any of the co-authors have the 
same affiliation as the first author, add his name af-
ter an & (or a comma if more names follow). Delete 
the words A.B. Author etc. and place the cursor on 
the A of Affiliation. Type the correct affiliation 
(Name of the institute, City, State/Province, Coun-
try). Now delete the word Affiliation. If there are au-
thors linked to other institutes, place the cursor at the
end of the affiliation line just typed and give a re-
turn. Now type the name(s) of the author(s) and after 
a return the affiliation. Repeat this procedure until 
all affiliations have been typed. 
All these texts fit in a frame which should not be 
changed (Width: Exactly 187 mm (7.36"); Height: 
Exactly 73 mm (2.87") from top margin; Lock an-
chor).
2.4 Abstract frame
If there are no further authors place the cursor one 
space behind the word ABSTRACT: and type your 
abstract of not more than 150 words. The top of the 
first line of the abstract will be 73 mm (2.87") from 
the top of the type area. The complete abstract will 
fall in the abstract frame, the settings of which 
should also not be changed (Width: Exactly 187 mm 
(7.36"); Height: Automatic; Vertical 73 mm (2.87") 
from margin; Lock anchor).
2.5 First line of text or heading
If your text starts with a heading, place the cursor on 
the I of INTRODUCTION and type the correct text 
for the heading. Now delete the word INTRODUC-
TION and start with the text after a return. This text 
should have the tag First paragraph.
If your text starts without a heading you should 
place the cursor on the I of INTRODUCTION, 
change the tag to First paragraph and type your text 
after deleting the word INTRODUCTION.
3 LAYOUT OF TEXT
3.1 Text and indenting
Text is set in two columns of 9 cm (3.54") width 
each with 7 mm (0.28") spacing between the col-
umns. All text should be typed in Times New Ro-
man, 12 pt on 13 pt line spacing except for the paper 
title (18 pt on 20 pt), author(s) (14 pt on 16 pt), and
the small text in tables, captions and references (10 
pt on 11 pt). All line spacing is exact. Never add any 
space between lines or paragraphs. When a column 
has blank lines at the bottom of the page, add space 
above and below headings (see opposite column).
First lines of paragraphs are indented 5 mm (0.2") 
except for paragraphs after a heading or a blank line 
(First paragraph tag).
3.2 Headings
Type primary headings in capital letters roman 
(Heading 1 tag) and secondary and tertiary  headings 
in lower case italics (Headings 2 and 3 tags). Head-
ings are set flush against the left margin. The tag 
will give two blank lines (26 pt) above and one (13 
pt) beneath the primary headings, 1½ blank lines (20 
pt) above and a ½ blank line (6 pt) beneath the sec-
ondary headings and one blank line (13 pt) above the 
tertiary headings. Headings are not indented and nei-
ther are the first lines of text following the heading 
indented. If a primary heading is directly followed 
by a secondary heading, only a ½ blank line should 
be set between the two headings. In the Word pro-
gramme this has to be done manually as follows: 
Place the cursor on the primary heading, select Para-
graph in the Format menu, and change the setting for 
spacing after, from 13 pt to 0 pt. In the same way the 
setting in the secondary heading for spacing before 
should be changed from 20 pt to 7 pt.
3.3 Listing and numbering
When listing facts use either the style tag List signs 
or the style tag List numbers.
3.4 Equations
Use the equation editor of the selected word pro-
cessing programme. Equations are not indented 
(Formula tag). Number equations consecutively and 
place the number with the tab key at the end of the 
line, between parantheses. Refer to equations by 
these numbers. See for example Equation 1 below:
From the above we note that sin T = (x + y)z or:
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where ca = interface adhesion; G = friction angle at 
interface; and k1 = shear stiffness number.
For simple equations in the text always use super-
script and subscript (select Font in the Format
menu). Do not use the equation editor between text 
on same line.
The inline equations (equations within a sen-
tence) in the text will automatically be converted to 
the AMS notation standard.
3.5 Tables
Locate tables close to the first reference to them in 
the text and number them consecutively. Avoid ab-
breviations in column headings. Indicate units in the 
line immediately below the heading. Explanations 
should be given at the foot of the table, not within 
the table itself. Use only horizontal rules: One above 
and one below the column headings and one at the 
foot of the table (Table rule tag: Use the Shift-minus 
key to actually type the rule exactly where you want 
it). For simple tables use the tab key and not the ta-
ble option. Type all text in tables in small type: 10 
on 11 points (Table text tag). Align all headings to 
the left of their column and start these headings with 
an initial capital. Type the caption above the table to 
the same width as the table (Table caption tag). See 
for example Table 1.
3.6 Figure captions
Always use the Figure caption style tag (10 points 
size on 11 points line space). Place the caption un-
derneath the figure (see Section 5). Type as follows: 
‘Figure 1. Caption.’ Leave about two lines of space 
between the figure caption and the text of the paper.
3.7 References
In the text, place the authors’ last names (without in-
itials) and the date of publication in parentheses (see 
examples in Section 5). At the end of the paper, list 
all references in alphabetical order underneath the 
heading REFERENCES (Reference heading   tag). 
The references should be typed in small text (10 pt 
on 11 pt) and second and further lines should be in-
dented 5.0 mm (0.2") (Reference text tag). If several 
works by the same author are cited, entries should be 
chronological:
Larch, A.A. 1996a. Development ...
Larch, A.A. 1996b. Facilities ...
Larch, A.A. 1997. Computer ...
Larch, A.A. & Jensen, M.C. 1996. Effects of ...
Larch, A.A. & Smith, B.P. 1993. Alpine ...
3.7.1 Typography for references 
Last name, First name or Initials (ed.) year. Book title. City: 
Publisher.
Last name, First name or Initials year. Title of article. Title of 
Journal (series number if necessary) volume number (issue 
number if necessary): page numbers.
3.7.2 Examples
Grove, A.T. 1980. Geomorphic evolution of the Sahara and the 
Nile. In M.A.J. Williams & H. Faure (eds), The Sahara and 
the Nile: 21-35. Rotterdam: Balkema.
Jappelli, R. & Marconi, N. 1997. Recommendations and preju-
dices in the realm of foundation engineering in Italy: A his-
torical review. In Carlo Viggiani (ed.), Geotechnical engi-
neering for the preservation of monuments and historical 
sites; Proc. intern. symp., Napoli, 3-4 October 1996. Rot-
terdam: Balkema.
Johnson, H.L. 1965. Artistic development in autistic children. 
Child Development 65(1): 13-16.
Polhill, R.M. 1982. Crotalaria in Africa and Madagascar. Rot-
terdam: Balkema.
3.8 Notes
These should be avoided. Insert the information in 
the text. In tables the following reference marks 
should be used: *, **, etc. and the actual footnotes  
set directly underneath the table.
3.9 Conclusions
Conclusions should state concisely the most im-
portant propositions of the paper as well as the au-
thor’s views of the practical implications of the re-
sults.
4 PHOTOGRAPHS AND FIGURES
Number figures consecutively in the order in which 
reference is made to them in the text, making no dis-
tinction between diagrams and photographs. Figures 
should fit within the column width of 90 mm (3.54") 
or within the type area width of 187 mm (7.36").
Figures, photographs, etc. can be in black/white or 
full color, but will be produced in the book in 
black/white only. Paste copies of the same size onto 
the typescript where you want them to appear in the 
text. Do not place them sideways on a page; howev-
er if this cannot be avoided, no other text (except the 
figure caption) should appear on that page. Figures, 
etc. should not be centered, but placed against the 
left margin. Leave about two lines of space between 
the actual text and figure (including caption). Nev-
er place any text next to a figure. Leave this space 
blank. The most convenient place for placing figures 
is at the top or bottom of the page. Avoid placing 
text between figures as readers might not notice the 
text. Keep in mind that everything will be reduced to 
75%. Therefore, 9 point should be the minimum size 
of the lettering. Lines should preferably be 0.2 mm 
(0.1") thick. Keep figures as simple as possible. 
Avoid excessive notes and designations.
Figure 1. Caption of a typical figure. Photographs will be 
scanned by the printer. Always supply original photographs.
Photographs should be with good contrast and on 
glossy paper. Photographic reproductions cut from 
books or journals, photocopies of photographs and 
screened photographs are unacceptable. The pro-
ceedings will be printed in black only. For this rea-
son avoid the use of colour in figures and photo-
graphs. Colour is also nearly always unnecessary for 
scientific work.
5 PREFERENCES, SYMBOLS AND UNITS
Consistency of style is very important. Note the 
spacing, punctuation and caps in all the examples 
below.
 References in the text: Figure 1, Figures 2-4, 6, 
8a, b (not abbreviated)
 References between parentheses: (Fig. 1), (Figs 
2-4, 6, 8a, b) (abbreviated)
 USA / UK / Netherlands / the Netherlands instead 
of U.S.A. / U.K. / The Netherlands
 Author & Author (1989) instead of Author and 
Author (1989)
 (Author 1989a, b, Author & Author 1987) instead
of (Author, 1989a,b; Author and Author, 1987)
 (Author et al. 1989) instead of (Author, Author & 
Author 1989)
 Use the following style: (Author, in press); (Au-
thor, in prep.); (Author, unpubl.); (Author, pers. 
comm.)
Always use the official SI notations:
 kg / m / kJ / mm instead of kg. (Kg) / m. / kJ. 
(KJ) / mm.; 
 20°16c32ccSW instead of 20° 16c 32cc SW
 0.50 instead of 0,50 (used in French text); 9000 
instead of 9,000 but if more than 10,000: 10,000 
instead of 10000
 14C instead of C14 / C-14 and BP / BC / AD in-
stead of B.P. / B.C. / A.D.
 × 20 instead of u20 / X20 / x 20; 4 + 5 > 7 in-
stead of 4+5>7 but –8 / +8 instead of – 8 / + 8
 e.g. / i.e. instead of e.g., / i.e.,
6 SUBMISSION OF MATERIAL TO THE 
EDITOR
The camera-ready copy of the complete paper print-
ed on a high resolution printer on one side of the pa-
per as well as two copies of the paper should be sent 
to the editor after receiving the final acceptance no-
tice. The paper should be sent together with the 
signed Copyright form. Include the original photo-
graphs. Check whether the paper looks the same as 
this sample: Title at top of first page in 18 points, 
authors in 14 points and all other text in 12 points on 
13 points line space, except for the small text (10 
point on 11 point line space) used in tables, captions 
and references. Also check if the type width is 187 
mm (7.36"), the column width 90 mm (3.54"), the 
page length is 272 mm (10.71") and that the space 
above the Abstact is exactly as in the sample. Write 
your name and the shortened title of the paper in 
pencil in the bottom margin of each page and num-
ber the pages correctly.
7 DEADLINE
The above material should be with the editor before 
the deadline for submission. Any material received 
too late will not be published. Send the material by 
airmail or by courier well packed and in time. Be 
sure that all pages are included in the parcel.
